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3.1  Introduction 
 On the French Caribbean island of Martinique in late April 1902,  La Commission 
Sur le Volcan (Commission on the Volcano) met to decide a course of action. The 
island’s Mt. Pelée was sending steam and smoke skyward, the smell of sulfur was in 
the air, and swarms of insects were moving down the mountain into neighboring 
cane fi elds. Frequent earthquakes and a thin layer of ash had set the population 
(particularly in the coastal city of St. Pierre) on edge and created a sense of crisis. 
The Commission included doctors, pharmacists, and science teachers, all appointed 
by the Governor. They discussed the potential of an eruption and what precautions, 
including evacuation, should be considered. The island was in the midst of general 
elections, complicating a response. After several meetings, the Commission made 
its decision, and announced “There is nothing in the activity of Pelée that warrants 
a departure from St. Pierre…the safety of St. Pierre [is] absolutely assured.” Posters 
were placed throughout the town announcing the public’s safety. 
 On May 8 Mt. Pelée erupted with an incandescent, high-velocity ash fl ow, 
 associated hot gases, and dust – a pyroclastic fl ow of great destructive power. The 
cloud of hot ash and gases raced into St. Pierre at an estimated speed of 160 km/h 
(Fig .  3.1 ). Approximately 30,000 residents (including all members of the Commission) 
died within minutes, leaving only two survivors. One eyewitness described the scene:
 The whole side of the mountain seemed to gape open, and from the fi ssure belched a lurid 
whirlwind of fi re, which wreathed itself into vast masses of fl ame as, with terrible speed, it 
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descended on the doomed town. Before the true extent of the peril could be grasped, the 
fi ery mass swept like a river over the town, and thrusting the very waters of the sea before 
it, set the ships ablaze. (Fermor  1950 ) 
 Environmental crises require decisions, and such fateful decisions require 
 science. The distinctive and increasingly critical role of interdisciplinary science – 
including the physical, biological, and social sciences – during environmental crises 
is the topic of this chapter. 
 The structural processes of science have long been studied and debated (see for 
example Kuhn’s  The Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions ,  1962 , and commentary by 
Sarder  2000 ). However, the distinctive context of science during crisis events – and 
how best to conduct and deliver “crisis” science – has largely been left to historians 
(such as Richard Rhodes in  The Making of the Atomic Bomb ,  1986 ), scientists engaged 
in such work (Freudenburg and Gramling  2011 ; Machlis and McNutt  2011 ; Lubchenco 
et al.  2012 ), and critics focused on specialized or unusual cases (Taleb  2007 ). Crises 
vary in intensity, consequence, and scope – and range from events of war and security 
to health and public safety. They are often refl ected in the strange and vivid metaphors 
surrounding crisis management: “black swans,” “wicked problems,” “acute events,” 
and so forth (Rittel and Webber  1973 ; Taleb  2007 ; Brown et al.  2010 ). 
 Historical and contemporary experience suggests that science – including the 
physical, biological, and social sciences – plays an increasingly critical role in gov-
ernmental and institutional responses to major environmental crises such as those 
caused by natural hazards or man-made disasters. Recent examples include major 
western US wildfi res (2009), the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (2010), the Fukushima 
nuclear plant failures (2011), and Hurricane Sandy (2012). 
 Fig. 3.1  Photograph of Mt. Pelée May 7, 1902 (Photograph by Angelo Helprin, survivor. St. 
Pierre, Martinique, French West Indies. 1902 collection, Prints & Photographs Division, Library of 
Congress, LC-USZ62-47617.  http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2006689820/ ) 
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 Understanding the structural processes of science during environmental crises 
may have considerable value in developing best practices for the conduct and delivery 
of science during crisis. In addition, focusing on the potential role of social science 
during these events is critical to social science practitioners and the broader commu-
nity of scientists, decision makers, and emergency responders who use social science 
to inform crisis response. There is also a substantial need to better defi ne the roles of 
 strategic and  tactical science during crises. While tactical science focuses on immedi-
ate challenges and technical solutions,  strategic science focuses on the longer-term 
issues of response and recovery, and considers longer chains of cascading conse-
quences than is typical in tactical approaches (Machlis and McNutt  2010 ,  2011 ). 
 In this chapter, we explore the role and signifi cance of science – including all 
disciplines and focusing attention on the social sciences – in responding to the needs 
of emergency response and recovery during major environmental crises. First, we 
examine the role of science during two recent major environmental crisis events – 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (2010) and Hurricane Sandy (2012). Second, we 
briefl y review several specifi c examples of social science applied to environmental 
crisis events – Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh (2007), the Puerto Aysen earthquake in 
Chile (2007), and Hurricane Katrina in the US (2005). Third, we identify several 
distinctive characteristics of strategic science during environmental crises. Finally, 
we describe a modest research agenda to advance the role of science during environ-
mental crises. 
3.2  Science During Crisis: Two Examples 
3.2.1  2010: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
 On April 20, 2010, the  Deepwater Horizon drilling platform catastrophically 
exploded and later collapsed into the sea, killing11 men and spilling over 4.9  million 
barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, making it one of the worst man-made envi-
ronmental disasters in US history (Mabus  2010 ; McNutt et al.  2012 ). Compared to 
other oil spills, Deepwater Horizon was unprecedented in its complexity and impact. 
At its peak, oil and tar balls contaminated the coastlines of all fi ve Gulf states and 
led to the closure of 229,271 sq. km of federal waters to fi shing (Mabus  2010 ). 
Response efforts included more than 47,000 personnel, 7,000 vessels, 120 aircraft, 
and the participation of scores of federal, state, and local agencies, universities, and 
non-governmental organizations (Mabus  2010 ). 
 In contrast to surface spills such as Exxon Valdez in Alaska (1989) or the Santa 
Barbara oil spill (1969), the Deepwater Horizon spill occurred at depth – crude oil 
fl owed from a broken drill pipe approximately 1,500 m below the surface of the 
water. The extreme depth of the spill introduced new challenges in both engineering 
and environmental conditions that had to be overcome. Response crews needed 
ships with remotely operated vehicles equipped with sophisticated sensors, cam-
eras, and robotic arms to navigate the wreckage and access the well. Engineers had 
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to rapidly devise new capping devices to kill the well, which were thwarted by the 
formation of gas hydrates – crystals of methane ice that only form at depth – 
 clogging the devices during several deployment attempts. Oil spilled into the Gulf 
continuously for nearly three consecutive months, polluting a three-dimensional 
area that extended vertically from the seafl oor to the surface, and laterally across the 
Gulf, impacting the people, the environment, and the economy of the region. 
 Science played a vital role in stopping and responding to the spill. Because of the 
extreme complexity of the disaster, researchers and engineers from across aca-
demia, the federal government, and the private sector were called on to contribute 
their expertise in fi elds such as oceanography, geology, underwater engineering, 
physics, public health, and ecology (Lubchenco et al.  2012 ). Teams of scientists and 
the leaders of major federal science agencies including the Department of Energy, 
the US Geological Survey, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) were stationed at or near Incident Command centers established through-
out the Gulf. Tactical science response efforts included geochemical “fi ngerprint-
ing” of the oil, calculating the rate of fl ow from the broken pipe, and modeling the 
surface migration of oil using information on currents in the Gulf. The National 
Science Foundation awarded over 11 million dollars through its Rapid Response 
grants to research the spill. 
 Social science research was ongoing during the spill (April–September 2010), 
though it was fragmented, sometimes  ad hoc , and largely peripheral to the engineer-
ing, toxicology, and ecological research that formed the core of the scientifi c 
response. While the Natural Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) mandated the 
documentation of human health, social impacts, economic impacts, and cultural 
resource damage, this work often lagged behind other NRDA needs. Later, in a 
post-incident review of science conducted during the crisis, Lubchenco et al. ( 2012 ) 
called for a “greater emphasis on social science data collecting including adequate 
baselines, to understand costs to the region and the nation of oil spill disasters” in 
the future. 
 During the crisis, the unplanned and sporadic nature of on-the-ground social 
 science led to specifi c topics receiving signifi cant attention. An example is the 
research on the psychological impacts of the spill. Grattan et al. ( 2011 ) and Morris 
et al. ( 2013 ) used a community-based participatory model to perform standardized 
assessments of psychological distress, comparing populations in communities 
directly and indirectly impacted by the spill. They found no signifi cant differences: 
residents in both communities displayed clinically signifi cant depression and anxi-
ety. Abramson et al. ( 2010 ) focused on the impact of the spill on children in the 
region, and found heightened mental health distress. Lee and Blanchard ( 2012 ) 
found, interestingly, that community attachment associated with higher levels of 
anxiety and fear, based on data collected in three Louisiana parishes during the spill. 
 During the spill, there were numerous calls for interdisciplinary approaches for 
dealing with the spill, its environmental and socioeconomic impacts, and the need to 
bolster resilience of affected communities (see for example Levy and Gopalakrishnan 
 2010 ). One signifi cant response was scenario-building conducted by the Department 
of the Interior’s (DOI) experimental Strategic Sciences Working Group (SSWG), 
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which analyzed the cascading consequences of the spill to inform decision-makers 
on near-term and long-term impacts (Machlis and McNutt  2010 ,  2011 ). 
 The SSWG was established quickly and included both federal and non-federal 
ecologists, social scientists, oceanographers, and other disciplinary experts. The 
SSWG worked extensively to create “chain of consequences” scenarios that 
included both biophysical and socioeconomic impacts (Department of the Interior 
 2010 ). Using the human ecosystem model (Machlis et al.  1997 ) as an organizing 
framework, and qualitatively assessing uncertainties, the SSWG created several 
scenarios and briefed DOI leadership on fi ndings several times during the crisis. 
Figure  3.2 illustrates a small segment of one of the scenarios, focusing on commer-
cial fi shing and oyster bed closures. The numbers in the fi gure refl ect the uncertain-
ties associated with each consequence, with 5 being certain and lower numbers 
refl ecting less certainty.
 In September 2010, the spill offi cially ended when two relief wells enabled the 
well to be sealed. British Petroleum (BP), which had contracted the  Deepwater 
Horizon platform, later committed $500 million in research funds to be spent over 
a 10-year period to study the aftermath of the spill. An additional $350 million from 
the $4 billion settlement between BP and the federal government was given to the 
National Academy of Sciences to establish a new program focused on human health 
and ecosystem science of the Gulf of Mexico to be spent over a 30-year period 
(Shen  2012 ). 
 Even with the tremendous efforts of the scientifi c community to deliver critical 
information to the response, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill highlighted the need to 
improve coordination between agencies and the scientifi c community for ensuring 
effi cient, innovative, and thoughtful response to environmental crises. This neces-
sarily includes coordinated social science. As one report stated, “there is no national 
lead entity coordinating the mobilization of science assets across federal agencies 
 Fig. 3.2  A segment of one of the scenarios developed by the SSWG for the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill. This segment shows the cascading effects of commercial fi sh and oyster bed closures 
(Department of the Interior  2012 ) 
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and within the broader science community”(Consortium for Ocean Leadership 
 2010 ). While the National Response Framework defi nes the responsibilities of each 
federal agency for responding to a disaster, lessons learned from Deepwater Horizon 
suggest that new and/or improved organizational structures are necessary to facili-
tate the mobilization of the scientifi c community to aid response, and this continues 
to be a fertile area for innovations in science policy (e.g., Nature  2010 ). 
3.2.2  2012: Hurricane Sandy 
 In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy advanced toward the eastern seaboard of the 
United States. At the time of landfall near Atlantic City, New Jersey (NJ) on October 
29, Hurricane Sandy measured over 1,770 km in wind fi eld diameter and was clas-
sifi ed as a post-tropical storm (NOAA  2012 ; Blake et al.  2013 ). Combining with a 
nor’easter, Hurricane Sandy affected 17 states, producing storm surges of up to 
2.6 m, high precipitation including nearly 1 m of snow in areas of Maryland and 
West Virginia, and over 8.5 million households without power (Department of 
Energy  2012 ; Blake et al.  2013 ; US Geological Survey  2013 ). 
 Multiple dimensions of Sandy have required – and continue to require – tactical 
interdisciplinary science to support response efforts. Atmospheric scientists and 
meteorologists played a critical role in monitoring and assessing the formation and 
evolution of Sandy as it moved through the Caribbean, making landfall in Cuba 
before slowly progressing northward to pick up speed again before making its sec-
ond landfall in New Jersey (Blake et al.  2013 ). Hydrologists deployed over 150 
stream gauges to monitor storm surge while oceanographers evaluated potential 
damage to protective dunes and barrier islands (US Geological Survey  2013 ). In the 
aftermath of the storm, engineers were called upon to assess structural damage 
caused by fl ooding and wind. Public health experts, toxicologists, and chemists 
continue to assess health threats posed by mold in fl ooded houses, asbestos released 
from destroyed buildings, and other contaminants mobilized during fi res that broke 
out during the storm. 
 Beginning days before Sandy’s landfall and during the storm, social science 
efforts focused on providing necessary psychological and mental health services 
to the affected region. FEMA and American Red Cross deployed mental health 
professionals to the area days before the storm in preparation for supporting the 
citizens of the affected area. In the aftermath of the storm, multiple organizations 
launched social science studies to assess different dimensions – ranging from 
post-traumatic stress to the use of social media – of the storm’s impacts on the 
social fabric of the region. FEMA awarded $82 million to the state of New York 
to “deliver immediate mental health outreach, crisis, and education services” to 
200,000 individuals in the region through its Immediate Services Crisis 
Counseling Assistance and Training Program (Sederer  2012 ). The Pew Research 
Center Project for Excellence in Journalism analyzed the public’s use of social 
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media from October 29–31, 2012 to examine how individuals interacted with one 
another and with news and information. The study found that “fully 34 % of the 
Twitter discourse about the storm involved news organizations providing con-
tent, government sources offering information, people sharing… eye witness 
accounts, and still more passing along information posted by others” (Pew 
Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism  2013 ). At the organiza-
tional scale, one study examined the development of new partnerships in disaster 
relief operations, using Sandy as a case study and showing that 66 % of the part-
nerships that were relied on during Sandy response were new (Coles and Zhuang 
 2013 ). Other ongoing social science studies have examined how volunteer orga-
nizations have played a critical role in stabilizing communities, and how the 
mental and physical stress of disruption and displacement may impact local citi-
zens and health care providers. 
 In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, strategic science was used to support 
 recovery efforts. In January 2013, the Secretary of the Interior directed the Strategic 
Sciences Group (SSG, formerly the Strategic Sciences Working group described 
above) to stand up a crisis science team to support the Department’s role on the 
cabinet-level Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force. In response, the SSG assem-
bled a team of experts from government, academia, and non-governmental institu-
tions to develop scenarios for the Task Force. The team was to examine the short- and 
long-term impacts of Hurricane Sandy and future major storms (such as another 
major hurricane) on the ecology, economy, and people of the affected New York/
New Jersey region. 
 The SSG’s Operational Group Sandy identifi ed 13 primary or “fi rst-tier” 
 consequences of Sandy on coastal communities and ecosystems – from ecological 
change and changes in coastal geomorphology to altered storm preparedness and 
response activity and altered perception of risk (Department of the Interior  2013 ). 
Together, these consequences and their cascading consequences span a broad and 
complex range of environmental, economic, and social effects. Similar to the work 
completed during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Hurricane Sandy scenarios 
used the human ecosystem model as an organizing framework; the scenarios are 
interdisciplinary and the impacts on the environment, infrastructure, and society are 
integrated throughout the scenarios. 
 One example of the SSG’s work is shown in Fig.  3.3 , which illustrates the 
 cascading consequences resulting from Hurricane Sandy’s fl ood damage to the built 
environment. This chain of consequences shows multiple dimensions of this dam-
age, including the creation of hazardous and non-hazardous debris, new challenges 
in transportation, and downstream impacts to the local economy.
 Using the results of the scenario, the SSG identifi ed potential interventions, 
defi ned as institutional actions that support recovery and increase the resilience of 
the coupled human-natural system to future storms. The 17 interventions included 
several recommendations to bolster research in different areas, including ecosystem 
services, environmental contamination, social services, and risk education and 
 communication (Department of the Interior  2013 ). 
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3.3  Examples of Social Science During Environmental 
Crisis Events 
 Social science played a role in both of the major environmental crises described 
above. In these events and other crises, the social sciences (particularly but not 
uniquely sociology of risk, decision sciences, and community sociology) have con-
tributed to both science during the crises and in the immediate aftermath as emer-
gency response and recovery is underway. In many cases the research led to specifi c 
recommendations for action to improve crisis response. Several examples follow. 
 In 2007, Bangladesh was devastated by Tropical Cyclone Sidr, a Category 4 
storm that killed 3,406 people and displaced or affected 27 million persons. A study 
by Paul ( 2012 ) examined factors that led to the resident’s response to evacuation 
orders; the range of response is compelling, with only one-third of respondents 
evacuating to shelters. Policy recommendations to improve response during the cri-
sis include expanded outreach programs, additional shelters, and evacuation drills. 
 From December 2006 to April 2007, the small Chilean town of Aysen (popula-
tion 15,000) experienced intense seismic activity. Thousands of tremors were 
detected in the area, building up to a large earthquake on April 21, 2007. Though the 
 Fig. 3.3  Example chain of consequences from the SSG’s Hurricane Sandy scenarios, showing the 
cascading consequences resulting from fl ood damage to the built environment in coastal communi-
ties. The numbers in the fi gure refl ect the uncertainties associated with each consequence, with 5 
being certain and lower numbers refl ecting less certainty (Department of the Interior  2013 ) 
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earthquake itself was not a major event (magnitude 6.2), it did cause massive 
 landslides, which in turn created localized tsunami waves that led to the death of 10 
residents. During the seismic activity period, a parallel socio-political crisis devel-
oped, as controversy arose regarding the “decisions and best-suited measures 
required to prevent a potential disaster.” A study by Soule ( 2012 ) reported on the 
factors that led to the socio-political crisis, which was centered on the perception 
(and eventual realization) of an imminent disaster, and makes recommendations for 
improving risk management as a result. Soule concludes that these fi ndings “must 
be connected to a broader tendency to reject technocratic and centralized risk man-
agement” and calls for the incorporation of social science information during the 
assessment and decision making stages of risk management. 
 Hurricane Katrina made US landfall in Louisiana on August 29, 2005 as a large 
Category 3 hurricane. The levee system protecting New Orleans was breached, and 
over 75 % of the city and nearby parishes were fl ooded. The storm (and subsequent 
fl ooding) led to 1,833 deaths and over $81 billion dollars in property damage. 
A relatively large social science literature has emerged about the event, much of it 
based on data collected during or immediately after the crisis. For example, Millin 
et al. ( 2006 ) examined disaster medical assistance in both Mississippi and a volun-
teer site near New Orleans. Treatment of chronic disease, primary health care and 
routine emergency care not related to the hurricane were the most common needs. 
The authors suggested that in addition to acute medical needs, “disaster planners 
should prepare to provide primary health care, administer vaccinations, and provide 
missing long-term medications.” 
 Vu and Van Landingham ( 2012 ) took advantage of survey work done just weeks 
prior to Hurricane Katrina, and were able to conduct a pre- and post-disaster assess-
ment of physical and mental health consequences for working-age Vietnamese 
immigrants to New Orleans. The researchers located and re-assessed more than 
two-thirds of the original study cohort. They found statistically signifi cant declines 
in physical and mental health status after the fi rst anniversary of the storm, and 
substantial recovery by the second anniversary. Recovery varied by a number of key 
sociological variables (such as occupational type and marital status), and the authors 
suggested the results “present clear opportunities for targeted interventions.” 
3.4  Distinctive Characteristics of Science 
During Environmental Crises 
 The examples presented reveal the importance of science during environmental  crises. 
In addition to traditional discipline-focused tactical research, the need and opportunity 
for interdisciplinary strategic science is intensifi ed during such crises: decision makers 
need to quickly understand the impacts on coupled natural-human systems, the uncer-
tainties and limitations that surround fi ndings and analysis, the cascading consequences 
of the event, and an accurate sense of place that links the science to “on-the-ground” 
(or in the water) realities associated with a specifi c crisis event, time, and place. 
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 Hence, the application of strategic science during environmental crises has  several 
distinctive characteristics that are essential requirements if it is to be useful to decision 
makers. Many of these characteristics may also be relevant to crises other than envi-
ronmental. With all of these, it is critical to stress that science during crisis can only be 
effective when  all relevant disciplines of science – the physical, biological, and social – 
are fully integrated and actively engaged. Six key characteristics are described below. 
3.4.1  The Importance of Coupled Human-Natural Systems 
 Science during environmental crises benefi ts from recognizing the need to evaluate 
and respond to the crisis using a systems approach, where consequences such as 
dune erosion during a hurricane are not just interpreted as an environmental change 
and loss of habitat, but as a storm consequence that may also compromise the safety 
of houses (and thereby households) that rely on these natural storm buffers for pro-
tection. Models of coupled human-natural systems are especially valuable to such 
strategic science. 
 One example (among many) is the human ecosystem model (Machlis et al.  1997 , 
see Fig.  3.4 ) applied during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Department of the 
Interior  2010 ,  2012 ) and most recently Hurricane Sandy. It describes a reasonably 
detailed coupled human-natural system, including both biophysical and sociocul-
tural variables, as well as fl ows of individuals, energy, nutrients, information, mate-
rials, capital, and information. The human ecosystem model originated in the 1997 
paper entitled “The human ecosystem as an organizing concept” that was published 
in two parts in the journal  Society and Natural Resources . A modest commentary 
has appeared (see for example Rudel  1999 ), and applications have included the 
National Science Foundation’s Long Term Ecological Research Program in 
Baltimore, MD, a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration training pro-
gram, and the United Nations Environmental Program on Sustainability. Models 
like these are essential for achieving a holistic approach to assessing impacts and 
anticipating cascading consequences, particularly during crises where the full range 
of consequences is both unknown and uncertain.
3.4.2  The Challenge of Collaboration 
and Interdisciplinary Teams 
 During non-crisis times, scientifi c research is conducted by individual principal 
investigators and/or teams of scientists. Research teams are often multi-institutional 
and in most cases, researchers collaborate with colleagues they have worked with in 
the past or with whom they have some pre-existing relationship. New collaborations 
are often formed through the long-term exchange of knowledge and ideas at regu-
larly scheduled workshops, academic conferences, and peer-reviewed publications. 
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 By necessity, science during crisis is also often conducted by multidisci-
plinary teams where these teams are often formed quickly in response to the 
event. For environmental crises, members may represent fi elds ranging from the 
physical and natural sciences to human biology and social sciences. These teams 
are also multi- institutional and include scientists from the academic, govern-
ment, non-profi t, and private sectors. In many cases, the individuals in crisis 
science teams have not previously worked together before (see Fig.  3.5 ). 
Examples include the nuclear physics theorists and weapons engineers of 
Manhattan Project during WWII, teams of engineers from manufacturer plants 
and universities working together to solve the Apollo 13 crisis, and academic and 
federal geoscientists working with oil industry engineers to address the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill.
 The urgency of the task, compression of time available for research, and lack of 
previous collaboration can add additional challenges in communication among sci-
entists, as well as issues of trust and collaboration styles. At the same time, a shared 
and critical mission can promote cooperative behavior and remove traditional barri-
ers to collaboration by establishing common ground, focus upon mission rather than 
process, and recognition of expertise rather than representation of organizations, 
institutions, and academic pedigree or rank. 
 Fig. 3.4  A framework for the coupled human-natural system, showing the interconnectedness of 
critical resources and the social system is useful for guiding science during environmental crises 
(Adapted from Machlis et al.  1997 ) 
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3.4.3  The Importance of Uncertainties and Limitations 
 During an environmental crisis, conditions can rapidly change: for example, an 
earthquake may trigger a tsunami, which may cause a nuclear emergency; evolv-
ing weather conditions may intensify an approaching hurricane, divert a storm 
track, and complicate evacuations. Working with limited knowledge and operat-
ing with uncertainty is inherent to responding to – and making decisions during – a 
crisis. For science during crisis to be useful to decision makers, it is essential to 
establish and explicitly state levels of uncertainty and knowledge limitations. For 
example, during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, multiple studies produced dif-
ferent evaluations for the volume of oil leaking from the broken pipe on the sea-
fl oor (McNutt et al.  2012 ). These assessments had important and immediate 
implications for determining the best technical solution to capping the wellhead, 
determining the amount of chemical dispersant to be applied, planning for con-
tainment of oil once it reached the surface, and evaluating the extent of damage 
to the environment (McNutt et al.  2012 ). Determining and communicating scien-
tifi c uncertainty with the fl ow rate estimates was essential to guiding sound deci-
sion-making during the spill, and retrospective analysis of these estimates have 
provided valuable lessons learned for responding to future deep sea blowouts 
(McNutt et al.  2012 ). 
 Similarly, the scenarios built by the DOI Strategic Sciences Group included 
formal evaluations of scientific uncertainty for each consequence in a chain of 
consequences; the evaluation (made using expert opinion and following the pre-
cautionary principle) was adapted from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s uncertainty scale associated with climate change, and other scales 
(see Weiss  2003 ). 
 Fig. 3.5  Schematic collaboration patterns of science teams during non-crisis and crisis times. On 
the  left is a schematic network diagram of a science team operating during non-crisis times. Nodes 
represent individual scientists and links represent previous collaboration (e.g., via co-investigators 
on a grant proposal or co-authoring a publication). Members of this team have worked with one 
another before. On the  right is a schematic of a crisis science team, showing that only a few of the 
members have previously collaborated (After Börner  2010 ,  2011 ) 
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3.4.4  The Value of Cascading Consequences 
and Assessing Impacts 
 To be effective during emergency response, recovery, and restoration, science 
 during environmental crises often requires the examination of cascading conse-
quences over both short- and long-term time scales. “Chains of consequences” illus-
trate changes, effects, or impacts resulting from an event. A chain of consequences 
begins with an event – such as a major oil spill or hurricane – and branches out, like 
a fl ow chart or tree diagram, showing possible cascading events. Each consequence 
in the chain has the potential to lead to other consequences. Each consequence in the 
chain can be assigned a level of scientifi c uncertainty – an assessment used to com-
municate the certainty or likelihood of a consequence. 
 Chains of consequences can reveal unanticipated effects of different events. For 
example, during Hurricane Sandy, storm surge caused severe fl ooding in homes and 
businesses across the affected region. In the community of Breezy Point, New York, 
a fl ooded electrical system led to fi res that destroyed more than 120 homes (New 
York 1 News  2012 ), leading to the potential release of lead-based paints and the 
threat of additional health risks to fi rst responders and the community (Plumlee 
et al.  2012 ). 
 Examining such chains of consequences is an area of science during crisis where 
strategic science can be extremely valuable. While essential tactical science, such as 
analyzing contaminated fl ood sediments from a hurricane or monitoring radioactiv-
ity in local water supplies, can be on-going during and after an environmental crisis, 
strategic science can complement tactical efforts by evaluating the cascading effects 
of an event across the coupled human-natural system. 
 This approach is illustrated by the work of the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) 
Strategic Sciences Working Group (SSWG) during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 
The SSWG convened two scenario-building sessions (the fi rst just days after the 
start of the event, the second while the wellhead had not yet been capped) to build 
scenarios analyzing the cascading consequences of the spill. Defi ning boundary 
conditions such as a fl ow rate estimate, geographic extent, and time horizons, the 
SSWG assessed short- and long-term consequences such as the effects of chemical 
dispersants, damage to wetlands, and impact to the local economy (Department of 
the Interior  2010 ,  2012 ; Machlis and McNutt  2010 ). 
3.4.5  The Need for Sense of Place 
 Every environmental crisis is different from the last or the next: a major earthquake 
in southern California will require different response than an oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico or a severe tornado in Oklahoma. Even similar crises have place-based dif-
ferences: an Alaskan Arctic oil spill differs from a Gulf of Mexico oil spill in tech-
nology, impacts, response, and restoration/recovery strategies. Depending on where 
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and when the crisis occurs and the severity of damage, people in the affected region 
are impacted differently – the result of factors including geographic location, socio-
economic status, and sociocultural traits. Hence, science during environmental 
 crises must work with an accurate sense of place. Crisis science teams must rely 
heavily on members with local knowledge who can provide place-specifi c informa-
tion on communities, cultures, values, history, and environment that can be essential 
to assessing risk and responding to unfolding events during a crisis. 
3.4.6  The Demands of Communicating Science During Crisis 
 Effectively communicating science is essential if the scientifi c information is to be 
used under the rapidly changing conditions, constrained time frames, multiple 
demands on decision makers, and limited resources that are typical during a crisis. 
First and foremost, scientifi c information must be communicated with extraordinary 
clarity and conciseness. Because the information may be used by non-scientifi c 
audiences, technical terms should be well defi ned if they must be used. Explanation 
of results, fi ndings, uncertainties and implications must take priority over descrip-
tions of background, relevant literature, or methods. 
 Communicating science during crisis can also benefi t from the use of compelling 
visualization. An example emerged during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill when 
graphic artists developed schematic diagrams of the broken pipe on the seafl oor. 
Derived from observations made with remotely operated vehicles, these visualizations 
aided scientists, responders, decision makers, and the public in understanding the com-
plexity of the damaged riser pipe over 1,500 m below the surface of the Gulf. Presentation 
tools – ranging from sketchpads to visualization software and mobile tablets – can be 
useful for translating scientifi c information quickly and effi ciently during a crisis. 
 To be effective in supporting decision making, science (and scientists) during 
crisis should have the capacity to speak “truth to power,” delivering diffi cult or 
unpopular fi ndings or analyses. Direct access to decision-makers is essential. Access 
requires trust. As shown in many of the previous examples, scientifi c information 
can be pivotal for decision making during a crisis. It must be delivered directly to 
decision makers unfettered by layers of bureaucracy and/or the public diversion of 
“science by interview” (whereby competing scientists present their personal views 
to reporters and/or commentators) now fashionable in the contemporary media. 
 Issues of transparency and public right-to-know are considerable, and must be 
adjudicated carefully. Post-crisis publication through peer reviewed literature and 
third-party evaluation are both potential solutions. However, while science during 
crisis should have access to decision-makers (and vice versa), it is the responsibility 
of the scientists involved to maintain their independence and credibility and role as 
“honest brokers” (Pielke  2007 ) by presenting information rather than attempting to 
make policy or response decisions. For trust (and thereby access), it is essential that 
this distinction be maintained in communications between scientists and decision 
makers during crisis. 
G.E. Machlis and K. Ludwig
61
3.5  A Modest Research Agenda 
 Clearly, the application of science during crisis is not novel: it has been used to 
monitor and respond to events ranging from epidemics and terrorist attacks to man- 
made disasters and natural hazards. However, there has been little coordinated effort 
to formally characterize science (including social science) during crisis and to iden-
tify ways in which it can be improved for responding to future crisis events. This is 
particularly true for environmental crises, with the oft-repeated pattern of multiple 
jurisdictions, overlapping responsibilities, a traditional focus on tactical rather than 
strategic science, and high levels of uncertainty. 
 There are ample opportunities for improvement. New organizational frameworks 
could streamline the use and application of science during crisis. New technologies 
could improve visualization, communication, and the sharing of information among 
scientists, emergency responders, and the public. Advanced training, simulations, 
and workforce development could improve the preparation of the next generation of 
scientists needed to respond to future crisis events. Preparing decision makers to use 
science during crises and to make science-informed decisions is equally important. 
 While the role of science during crises – war, natural disasters, industrial accidents, 
pandemics, and more – has increased signifi cantly in contemporary times, there has 
been little scholarly attention devoted to the distinctive character of  science during 
crisis and how such science can most effectively be planned, conducted, examined, 
communicated, and applied to decision-making. This is particularly true for interdisci-
plinary and strategic science. Organizational frameworks for science during crisis have 
not been described, best practices have not been systematically identifi ed (Machlis and 
McNutt  2011 ; Machlis and Kooistra  2012 ), and a research agenda for understanding 
and improving science during crisis has not been proposed or implemented. 
 We suggest a modest fi rst step is to examine several essential questions:
 1.  Is science during crisis different than science practiced in non-crisis periods, and 
if so, how? 
 2.  If it is different, how do these differences affect the management, design,  conduct, 
analysis, application, and dissemination of science? 
 3.  How can science during crisis be improved and made more useful? 
 4.  How can the workforce and scientifi c community be better prepared? 
 5.  What are the most appropriate organizational frameworks and best practices for 
science during crisis? 
 6.  What role can interdisciplinary and strategic science play in responding to major 
crises? 
 A range of disciplines including sociology, anthropology, economics, organiza-
tional and management science, as well as policy studies can be fruitful partners in 
answering these questions. Historians of science can provide thoughtful guidance 
based on the role of science in historical and recent past events. For environmental 
crises, professionals in hazards management, emergency response, risk assessment, 
and resources management can be vital contributors, both as end-users of strategic 
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sciences and as “fi rst responders” responsible for emergency and recovery. Results 
should be shared broadly and thoughtfully converted to usable knowledge. The 
result would be improved science during crisis. 
3.6  Conclusion 
 In early 2009, tremors and foreshocks were increasing in the Abruzzo region of 
 central Italy. The swarms of small quakes concerned local citizens, and Italian science 
technician Giampaolo Giulian was predicting a major quake, only to be reported to 
the police. A select group of Italian scientists, all members of the National Commission 
for the Forecast and Prevention of Major Risks, met on March 31, to assess the situa-
tion, and decide on a course of action. A press conference was held after the meeting, 
led by the technical head of Italy’s Civil Protection Agency. He announced,
 the scientifi c community tells me there is no danger because there is an ongoing discharge 
of energy. The situation looks favorable. (Nosengo  2010 ) 
 Many citizens of the mountainous region were relieved, and evacuation or 
 precautionary pre-positioning of emergency supplies did not occur. 
 On April 6 a signifi cant (magnitude 6.3) earthquake epicentered near the town of 
L’Aquila, the capital of the Abruzzo, struck the region. It was at relatively shallow 
depth (8.8 km), and the region’s soil structure amplifi ed the seismic impact. Nearly 
 Fig. 3.6  Damage from 2009 L’Aquila Earthquake (Website of the Italian Civil Protection 
Department – Presidency of the Council of Ministers,  http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/
descrizione_sismico.wp;jsessionid=6EED29F25DA52C422634EE009FC67CAE?pagtab=3)  
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70 % of the buildings in L’Aquila were severely damaged or destroyed (Fig.  3.6 ). 
Over 300 persons died, 1,500 were injured, and thousands were left homeless (Kaplan 
et al.  2010 ). In a trial watched by the global scientifi c community with alarm, six of 
the scientists were convicted of manslaughter, for giving falsely assuring advice on 
possibility of a major and devastating quake. The convictions are under appeal.
 Severe environmental crises disrupt multiple dimensions of social, economic, 
and environmental systems over both short- and long-term time scales. It is likely 
that the complexity and impact of such crises will increase as human population 
continues to rise, technology becomes more complex and vulnerable, climate change 
acts as a driving force and/or accelerant for many environmental crises, and as local, 
regional, and national economies become more globalized and interdependent. 
Fatalities will likely increase in the future due to more people living in hazard- prone 
areas (e.g., Holzer and Savage  2013 ). The insurance industry has shown that the cost 
of property damage from natural hazards is increasing and even single events “can 
greatly strain a nation’s ability to deal with direct damage costs and indirect eco-
nomic, social, and cultural losses” ( American Geosciences Institute  2012 ). 
 Because of this growing cost and complexity, it is likely that science will play 
an increasingly signifi cant role in supporting response to and preparation for 
future environmental crises. Scientists, emergency managers, business leaders, 
educators, and local, state, and federal decision makers will have to cooperate to 
ensure public safety and to develop solutions to mitigating and adapting to risk. 
Beyond these challenges, the scientifi c community – including the social sciences 
and its practitioners – must grapple with the responsibility of science and scien-
tists during crisis, and the implications of events on the island of Martinique and 
the Italian region of Abruzzo. 
 Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
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